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ABSTRACT 
The media play an important role in risk communication, providing information about 
accidents, both nearby and far away. Each media channel has its own presentation style, 
which could influence how the audience perceives the presented risk. This study 
investigates the predictive power of twelve media channels (traditional media, new media 
and social media) for the perceived risk posed by radiation released from the damaged 
Fukushima nuclear power plant on respondents’ own health and that of the population in 
general. The analysis controlled for attitude towards nuclear energy, gender, education, 
satisfaction with the media coverage and duration of attention paid to the coverage. The 
study uses empirical data from a public opinion survey (N > 1,000), which are 
representative for the Belgian population with respect to six socio-demographic variables. 
Results show that some media channels do influence risk perception. Television, 
interpersonal communication and the category of miscellaneous online sources are 
significant predictors of the perceived health-related risk of the nuclear accident. More 
favourable attitudes towards nuclear power, longer attention to the coverage, and higher 
satisfaction with the provided information predict lower risk perception. Interpersonal 
communication is significantly related to satisfaction with the coverage: those unsatisfied 
with the information were more likely to engage in interpersonal communication. Taken 
together, the results suggest that the media can indeed have an influence on how the 
audience perceives a risk. 
Keywords: 
Fukushima nuclear accident, risk perception, traditional media, new media, social media 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Fortunately, major nuclear accidents do not occur often. Unfortunately, this means that research 
regarding how the public perceives the risk of actual nuclear accidents, and how these 
perceptions are shaped, is also comparatively rare. While risk is essentially all about 
probabilities(1), people rarely use statistical methods when making judgements about risks in daily 
life.(2) To form a perception of risk, people take into account various other factors, often 
qualitative in nature.(1, 3, 4) This way, they can worry a lot about comparatively minor or very 
unlikely risks, while ignoring things that really threaten them. Major events, such as the 2011 
Fukushima nuclear accident, can quickly make people aware of the prominence of a risk, and can 
make them more afraid even though the probabilities have not changed. 
The media play an important role in risk communication.(e.g., 3, 5, 6, 7) They provide the public 
with information about what happened. However, by doing so, they may also influence their 
audience. This can happen on purpose (with biased articles), but also unknowingly. Kasperson et 
al.(3) pointed to the possibility that each transmitter of information will change the original 
message by intensifying, weakening and/or filtering parts of it. As such, media are not just neutral 
intermediaries: they will change the information in the process, and this might influence the 
recipients of their messages. It is plausible that the unique characteristics of different media 
channels (regardless of content) may lead to different effects on their audience as well - which 
was already articulated in the much-quoted catchphrase “the medium is the message”.(8) 
The Fukushima nuclear accident offered a unique opportunity to study the effects that 
different media channels can have on the risk perception of actual nuclear accidents. Previous 
research on this topic is rare, often uses convenience samples and generally studies only a limited 
number of media channels. This study, on the other hand, included twelve media channels 
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(including traditional media, new media and social media), using a large sample (N = 1,002) that 
was representative for the Belgian population. 
The present study investigated whether media use during the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 
2011 had predictive power for the long-term risk perception in 2013, several years after the 
accident. More specifically, it explored the risk that respondents thought the radiation released 
from the damaged Japanese plant would have on their own health and on that of the general 
population. For example, the audience might believe that the radiation from Fukushima could 
increase the amount of cancers in Belgium. 
Belgium is an interesting case, notwithstanding the large distance between the country and 
Fukushima. Nuclear energy has been on the public agenda for a while now: in 2003, Belgium 
decided to phase out nuclear energy, but at the time of the accident it still had seven operational 
reactors. In 2013, development on a new research reactor started - evidence of a somewhat mixed 
relationship with the nuclear domain. Furthermore, the distance from the site of the nuclear 
accident provides the opportunity to compare the media use and effects of the indirectly affected 
Belgian population with available data from the directly affected population.(9) 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Media Channels: Fostering our Actual and Imagined Fears? 
Previous studies have provided some support for the hypothesis that media channels can have an 
influence on risk perception. Coleman(10) studied the influence of four media channels 
(newspapers, magazines, books and television) and interpersonal communication on risk 
perception in New York State. She found that media channels have a limited influence on both 
personal and voluntary societal risk. For involuntary societal risk, interpersonal communication 
with spouses or neighbours turned out to be the only communication channel that had significant 
influence. 
Research conducted in Japan regarding the Fukushima nuclear accident found that there 
were pronounced differences in the fears people had, depending on the kind of media they used 
as their source of information.(9) Those who listened to rumours were more fearful of the possible 
effects of radiation on their health. Readers of regional newspapers were more worried about the 
prospects for the future, while those who read the national newspapers were less worried. 
Respondents who listened to radio news were more fearful of social disruption breaking out in 
the aftermath of the accident. Neither television nor Internet use showed any significant 
correlations with either of these concerns. It is important to note, however, that these particular 
results are inherently linked to the Japanese context: for example, it is known that Japanese 
national newspapers tend to avoid controversies in order to protect the consensus and the 
harmony of Japanese society.(11) 
Newspapers are judged as highly trustworthy by the public: in studies conducted shortly 
after the Fukushima nuclear accident, both Japanese consumers(12) and Japanese parents(13) 
ranked them as the second most trustworthy source of information, immediately after NHK 
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(Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, Japan’s public broadcaster). It has also been experimentally demonstrated 
that newspapers are perceived as more credible than social media, which results in more people 
being willing to share their content online.(14) On the other hand, fewer Belgians (47%) rated 
newspapers as (very) trustworthy in the case of a nuclear accident, as compared to television 
(70%) and radio (65%).(15) 
An important role of newspapers is to provide the public with greater detail than what the 
other, “faster” media are able to. In the case of the Fukushima nuclear accident, newspapers and 
their associated websites gave extensive coverage: they often used infographics, multimedia and 
explanatory articles written by experts to inform their audience.(16) They also provided ample 
opinion pieces by different stakeholders.(17) In this way, newspapers were able to give their public 
a broader context and different perspectives on the disaster. However, readers of newspapers also 
have the choice not to read a certain article if it does not capture their interest.(18) 
The public also deems television to be highly trustworthy, both in Belgium(15) and in Japan 
in the aftermath of Fukushima. The public broadcaster in particular was seen as highly 
trustworthy.(12,13) Television news differs from newspaper news in different respects. Frewer, 
Rowe and Sjöberg(18) name two: firstly, television news draws a greater audience. Secondly, the 
audience does not have the same freedom in choosing what topics to watch: if a topic is featured 
in television news, the audience cannot help but watch it. Henning and Vorderer(19) suggest that 
this “linearity” would also make it more difficult for the viewers to think autonomously, since 
they cannot pause the broadcast to ponder upon the content. Thirdly, due to time constraints, 
television was not able to give the same extensive background and context that newspapers 
provided.(16) Television tells the public a hazard exists, but gives little background information 
beyond that.(18, p. 20) 
It is important to note the possible effects of visuals. Concerning printed media, research by 
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Zillmann, Knobloch and Yu(20) showed that the audience is significantly more likely to read 
articles accompanied by visuals, and read these articles with more attention. Moreover, if the 
accompanying image shows impending danger or damage caused by a threat, the audience recalls 
more information from the text. These effects could be more outspoken for the moving images on 
television: according to Reeves and Nass(21), the audience pays even more attention to a moving 
image than to a still one and attributes more importance to vivid information. Furthermore, they 
demonstrated that some types of movement (such as images “coming closer”) could make 
viewers feel threatened. Aust and Zillmann(22) found that television reports featuring upset 
victims cause the public to rate the presented risk as more dangerous to both themselves and 
people in general. 
Public broadcast radio was deemed highly trustworthy by the public in Japan, whereas the 
results on private channels were more mixed: Japanese consumers thought them to be highly 
trustworthy as well.(12) However, Japanese parents did not share this favourable view.(13) The 
Belgian public rated the radio as the second most trustworthy media channel after television.(15) 
Similar to television, radio news is linear, preventing the listeners from choosing what news to 
pay attention to. However, it misses the visuals that make television more engaging. 
The Internet gave rise to both great opportunities and problems for risk communication(16, 
23): it all but nullified the gatekeeping function of the traditional media, and gives unconventional 
experts a platform to distribute understandable information to the public, which can interact with 
these experts and among themselves. On the other hand, the Internet also helps the spread of 
misinformation, due to the very rapid news cycle it demands - with little room for fact-checking - 
and by giving a voice to people who may not have the necessary knowledge to accurately discuss 
complex issues. Additionally, once information, correct or false, went viral, few bothered to 
check its accuracy. Given these potential problems, it is perhaps not surprising that the public is 
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wary when it comes to Internet sources such as social media, judging them to be significantly less 
credible than other media channels.(12, 14) This perception might not match reality, seeing as 
tweets tagged with #fukushima often cited highly reliable sources.(12) Finally, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency(24) advised public information officers that in the case of a nuclear 
emergency, risk communication is most likely to succeed when communication is a two-way 
process. Since the possibility of interaction and two-way communication is a main feature of 
social media(14), it is reasonable to assume that social media would be highly effective in 
managing risk perception. 
YouTube is the third most accessed site on the Internet, according to Alexa.com (1 October 
2014). As such, it could play a major role in risk communication as well. However, research 
suggests that a majority of YouTube clips can be classified as “entertainment”, with only a small 
amount of videos in the categories of “News & Politics”, “Education” and “Science & 
Technology”.(25) Similarly, the share of college students that had watched at least some comedy-
format news shows was somewhat larger than the share of people that had watched at least some 
traditional news shows on YouTube. The sharing rate was also higher for “comedy” news than for 
traditional news.(26) However, other studies(27) have shown that even entertainment programs can 
increase risk perception. As of yet, it is still unclear how YouTube clips will influence risk 
perception. 
Although the different media channels have transformed the way in which risks are 
communicated, interpersonal communication still plays an important role in the diffusion of high 
impact stories: people will likely continue to talk with each other about important news events. 
Although information received from interpersonal communication might not be as detailed as 
information from the mass media, people still seem to attribute greater trustworthiness to 
information they heard from others, compared to information from a media channel.(28) After the 
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Fukushima nuclear disaster, parents in Japan indeed judged family and relatives as highly 
trustworthy: in fact, they were the second most trusted group, with only academic scientists 
deemed more trustworthy.(13) Coleman(10) found that interpersonal communication with spouses 
or neighbours had significant influence on risk perception of involuntary societal risk. In the 
aftermath of Fukushima, rumours were significantly associated with fear of radiation and health-
related risk perception.(9) 
All these studies led to the following research question: 
RQ1: Can the use of specific media channels predict the long-term health-related risk 
perception of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident? 
 
2.2. Duration of Attention Paid to the News 
Wåhlberg and Sjöberg(29) point to the availability heuristic as a theory often used in explaining 
risk perception: the easier one can recall a certain event happening, the more probable he or she 
will judge the likelihood of that event happening again. Extensive media coverage is one way in 
which events could become easier to recall(30), which would lead to people overestimating the 
probability of that kind of event.(1, 7) The fact that the Fukushima nuclear accident was compared 
to the Chernobyl nuclear accident in both the United States(31) and the European Union(32)  would 
make these accidents more “accessible” to the public, especially to people who paid attention to 
the news for a long period of time. The literature suggests they will have higher risk perception as 
a result. 
 
H1: People who followed the news about the Fukushima nuclear accident for a longer 
period of time have higher risk perception than people who followed it for a shorter 
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amount of time. 
 
2.3. Satisfaction with Media Coverage 
The role of the media in risk communication is - first and foremost - to provide the public with 
information. The Chernobyl nuclear accident demonstrates that a lack of information during a 
crisis situation creates uncertainty, which in turn exacerbates existing fear and stress.(33, 34) 
Even if information is available and accessible, the public may still not find it satisfactory. 
During the Fukushima nuclear accident, the provided information did not suit the needs of 
parents in Japan, what led them to experience higher anxiety.(13) 
Even if the population is not directly affected by the nuclear accident, satisfactory media 
coverage would probably prevent respondents from experiencing unnecessary uncertainty, 
anxiety and stress, which would lower their perceived risk. 
 
H2: Those who are more satisfied with the media coverage about the Fukushima nuclear 
accident have a lower risk perception of it than people who are less satisfied. 
 
2.4. Context Variables 
Based on existing literature, attitudes towards nuclear energy in general(e.g., 35, 36, 37), gender(e.g., 13, 
38, 39, 40) and education(e.g., 2, 10, 41, 42) can also have an influence on risk perception, so these 
variables were added to both analyses in order to test the influence of media channels in the wider 
context of risk perception. 
 
H3: Attitudes towards nuclear energy, education and gender will have significant 
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predictive power for long-term health-related risk perception. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This study was conducted using empirical data from the SCK•CEN Barometer 2013(43), a public 
opinion survey that was conducted with computer-assisted personal interviews. A company 
specialised in opinion research carried out the data collection between 15 August and 12 
September 2013. The Fukushima nuclear accident was still featured in the news when the 
fieldwork was conducted, with 196 articles featuring “Fukushima” published in all Belgian 
newspapers (search conducted on 26 February 2014 using academic.gopress.be). 
In order to gather representative data, a list of all Belgian municipalities was first divided 
into a total of 44 strata. The data were then gathered using a random walk method within each 
stratum.(43) The questionnaire gauged respondents’ attitude towards and knowledge about nuclear 
energy, and trust in and knowledge about several actors in the nuclear field. Finally, a section was 
devoted on the Fukushima nuclear accident, with questions regarding perception of the accident, 
solidarity with the victims, media use, and attitude towards contaminated foods and goods. Most 
questions had respondents answering using a Likert scale, with an option to not answer. Within 
most question sets, there was randomisation of the question order to combat order effects. 
A total of 1,002 respondents were interviewed face-to-face, in Dutch or French. After a 
weighing procedure, the sample was representative of the adult Belgian population with respect 
to gender, age, region, size of locality, education, professional activity and the size of household. 
All results reported in this paper made use of the weighed sample. 
Of the total sample, 64 respondents (6.4%) were not aware of the nuclear accident that 
happened in Fukushima. This group contained more women, χ² = 11.37; df = 1; p = 0.001, and 
was more likely to have no degree or only to have finished elementary school, χ² = 54.23; df = 8; 
p < 0.001. They were more likely to live in Flanders, χ² = 21.65; df = 2; p < 0.001, and to have 
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less members in their household (M = 2.46, SD = 1.34) compared to those who were aware of the 
accident (M = 2.82, SD = 1.35), t(1000) = 2.09; p = 0.037. There were no significant differences 
with respect to age, t(68.662) = 0.779; p = 0.439, the level of urbanisation of their municipality of 
residence, χ² = 1.76; df = 3; p = 0.623, or their income levels, χ² = 19.1; df = 12; p = 0.086. Since 
these respondents were not asked any further questions regarding their media use during the 
coverage of the Fukushima nuclear accident, they were not taken into account in this study. This 
left a total of 938 valid respondents for analysis. 
3.1.Operationalisation 
The use of the media channels was measured by asking respondents which media channels had 
been their important sources of information about the accident. Respondents could then pick as 
many options as they wanted from a list. Those who selected “Internet” as one of their initial 
choices were then presented with another list with the various Internet sources. 
For the dependent variable, the risk perception of the Fukushima nuclear accident, a scale 
was constructed using principal component analysis with Oblimin with Kaiser Normalisation. 
The factor analysis yielded a single factor, consisting of three items from the questionnaire. “In 
the near or far future, how high do you deem the risk that the radiation from the Fukushima 
nuclear accident poses to your own health?” and “In the near or far future, how high do you deem 
the risk that radiation in food products or other products from Japan poses to your own health?” 
were both measured from 1 (“no risk at all”) to 6 (“very high risk”). The third question, “Will the 
number of cancers in Belgium increase because of the accident in Fukushima?”, was measured 
from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). The obtained factor accounted for 70.95% of 
the variance and had good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.794). Since the items used 
different scales, internal reliability was measured using the factor scores. Each component in the 
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scale of risk perception had a factor loading of 0.77 or higher. A low score on the scale signified a 
low risk perception of the Fukushima nuclear accident. 
The satisfaction of respondents with the information they got from the media was measured 
using a single question: “In general, how satisfied were you with the information you got about 
the (Fukushima) accident?”. The possible answers ranged from 1 (“very unsatisfied”) to 5 (“very 
satisfied”). 
Duration, which stands for how long respondents followed the news about the nuclear 
accident, was also measured using a single question: “How long did you pay attention to news 
about the Fukushima accident?”. Answers ranged from 1 (“I did not follow the news about 
Fukushima at all”) to 6 (“I am still following the news about Fukushima”). 
The attitude towards nuclear power was measured using the answers to “What is your 
opinion on nuclear energy?”. The Likert scale ranged from 1 (“totally in favour of nuclear 
power”) to 5 (“totally against”). 
 
3.2. Analysis Procedures 
The predictive power of the media channels for the long-term health-related risk perception was 
calculated using two linear regression analyses. The first analysis was limited to the major 
categories of media channels (i.e., television, radio, newspapers, Internet and interpersonal 
communication - hereinafter referred to as “primary media channels”). Due to the range of online 
sources, a second analysis was run focusing on the different sources on the Internet. Satisfaction 
with the coverage and duration of attention were included in both analyses, as were attitude 
towards nuclear energy, gender and education. Education was recoded to have three levels. The 
lowest level of education consisted of respondents with no degree, an elementary level degree or 
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a lower secondary degree. The intermediate level consisted of people with a higher secondary 
level degree, whereas respondents in the high level held a higher education degree, either from a 
university or non-university higher education. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. Media as Important Information Sources 
The media played an important role in informing the public about the nuclear accident in 
Fukushima. Which media channels were most widely used, is shown in Tables I and II. The 
existence of a multimedia society is also apparent from the results: 66.6% of respondents used 
more than one media channel to inform themselves about the accident. On average, people used 
2.56 media channels (SD = 1.42) in their search for information about the accident. The majority 
of single-medium users were people who exclusively watched television (accounting for 25.04% 
of the total sample). 
Table I: Main Information Sources for the Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
 
 Percentage 
Television 93.4 
Radio 49.6 
Newspapers 48.5 
Internet 29.8 
Interpersonal Communication 16.2 
Total 
100 
(N = 938) 
Note: Measured as a percentage of all valid respondents; non-exclusive options 
 
 
Similar results appear for the online media channels: 63.9% of Internet users consulted more 
than one online information source. On average, they used 2.10 online media channels (SD = 
1.07). However, the distribution is skewed: none of the respondents answered as having used all 
seven response options the questionnaire offered and only 10.2% of the audience had used more 
than three. 
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Table II: Online Information Sources for the Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
 
 Percentage 
of Internet Users 
Online Newspapers 84.0 
TV and radio station websites 49.9 
(Non-)governmental agencies websites 27.6 
Facebook 26.4 
Blogs 10.2 
Others (for example: YouTube) 8.9 
Twitter 3.3 
Total 
100 
(N = 280) 
Note: Measured as a percentage of all Internet users; non-exclusive options 
 
With the exception of television, all primary media channels were significantly correlated 
(at the 0.001 level) with the duration of attention paid to the media coverage (detailed results in 
Appendix). Additionally, three online sources were significantly correlated with the duration of 
attention, each at the 0.01 level, using a two-tailed test. Those who answered as having used a 
blog (r = 0.194) or the websites of (non-)governmental agencies (r = 0.175) were more likely to 
have paid attention to the coverage for a longer time. On the other hand, people who used 
Facebook (r = -0.158) were more likely to stop paying attention to the news sooner. 
Additionally, interpersonal communication was significantly correlated with satisfaction 
with media coverage (r = -0.113, p = 0.001), signifying that people who were not satisfied with 
the media coverage were more likely to engage in interpersonal communication. The use of 
websites of (non-)governmental agencies (r = -0.114, p = 0.058) and blogs (r = -0.117, p = 0.051) 
both approached a significant negative correlation with satisfaction (detailed results in the 
Appendix). 
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4.2. Influencing Factors of Long-Term Health-Related Nuclear Risk Perception 
The relationship between the media channels and risk perception was analysed using linear 
regression analysis, R² = 0.171, F(10,817) = 16.86, p < 0.001 (see Table III for results). The 
independent variables were all entered in the analysis at the same time. The dependent variable 
was the factor scale of the risk perception of the Fukushima nuclear accident. 
 
Table III: Predictive Power of Primary Media Channels for Long-Term Risk Perception 
 
Model: Risk Perception of the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Predictor β p SE 
Gender 0.052  0.064 
Attitude towards nuclear energy 0.291 *** 0.034 
Education - 0.139 *** 0.044 
Duration of attention paid to media coverage - 0.076 * 0.022 
Satisfaction with media coverage - 0.120 *** 0.035 
Media Channel: Television 0.064 * 0.138 
Media Channel: Radio 0.022  0.068 
Media Channel: Newspapers - 0.051  0.070 
Media Channel: Internet - 0.020  0.074 
Interpersonal Communication 0.117 *** 0.088 
Constant   0.269 
N = 828    
Adjusted R² = 0.161    
Note: Linear regression analysis; Dependent variable: factor scores of risk 
perception of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
 
Out of the five primary media channels studied, only two turned out to be significant 
predictors of the risk perception of the Fukushima nuclear accident: watching television (β = 
0.064, p = 0.048) and engaging in interpersonal communication (β = 0.117, p < 0.001) both 
predicted higher risk perception. 
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With the exception of gender, all other variables included in the analysis were significant 
predictors. The duration of attention paid to the media coverage was significant, but in the 
opposite direction than H1 predicted (β = -0.076, p = 0.024): respondents who paid attention to 
the news about Fukushima for a longer period of time had a lower risk perception. As predicted 
by H2, higher satisfaction with the media coverage was associated with lower risk perception (β 
= -0.120, p < 0.001). Attitude towards nuclear energy was the most influential predictor (β = 
0.291, p < 0.001): people who have a positive attitude towards nuclear power had a lower risk 
perception. Education had the second highest regression coefficient (β = -0.139, p < 0.001): 
people with a higher level of education did have lower risk perception, compared to those with a 
lower level of education. This provides limited support for H3, with two out of three context 
variables being significant predictors. 
An additional regression analysis was run for the different Internet sources, R² = 0.211, 
F(12,244) = 5.46, p < 0.001 (see Table IV for results). Once again, all variables were entered at 
the same time. 
Only one Internet source had significant predictive power. “Other sources, such as 
YouTube” had a highly significant negative β-coefficient (-0.186, p = 0.002). Attitude towards 
nuclear energy turned out to be the strongest predictor (β = 0.229, p < 0.001). The second most 
important predictor was satisfaction with media coverage (β = -0.204, p = 0.001), in the direction 
expected by H2. Gender became a significant predictor online: women had a significantly higher 
risk perception than men (β = 0.151, p = 0.01). Both educational level and duration of attention 
lost their predictive power, but educational level did approach significance (β = -0.114, p = 
0.058). Again, H3 received limited support, with two out of the three context variables being 
significant. 
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Table IV: Predictive Power of Online Sources for Long-term Risk Perception 
 
Model: Risk Perception of the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Predictor β p SE 
Gender 0.151 ** 0.113 
Attitude towards nuclear energy 0.229 *** 0.059 
Education - 0.114  0.082 
Duration of attention paid to media coverage - 0.100  0.040 
Satisfaction with media coverage - 0.204 *** 0.061 
Media Channel: Online newspapers 0.040  0.160 
Media Channel: TV and radio station websites - 0.021  0.116 
Media Channel: (Non-)governmental agencies websites 0.094  0.131 
Social Medium: Twitter 0.021  0.328 
Social Medium: Facebook 0.042  0.136 
Social Medium: Blogs - 0.066  0.195 
Media Channel: Others (for example: YouTube) - 0.186 ** 0.208 
Constant   0.417 
N = 257    
Adjusted R² = 0.173    
Note: Linear regression analysis; Dependent variable: factor scores of risk 
perception of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
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5. DISCUSSION 
This study set out to investigate the influence of twelve communication channels on the long-
term risk perception of the Fukushima nuclear accident, about two and a half years after it 
occurred, and aimed to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between media and risk 
perception in several different ways. Firstly, because a representative data set was used, the 
results would be perceived as more easily generalised. Secondly, this study considered the effects 
on perceived risk of an actual nuclear accident, rather than a hypothetical one. Finally, a whole 
range of media channels was included in the analyses, instead of focusing on just a couple. In 
particular, the role of radio has rarely been studied, even though the results showed that it was an 
important source of information for about one out of two respondents. 
The first research question dealt with the extent to which media channels would be good 
predictors of the risk perception of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident. Even when controlling 
for five background variables, some communication channels emerged as significant predictors of 
risk perception. Television and interpersonal communication were both related to higher risk 
perception, while various minor online sources (with YouTube as probably the most important 
one) were related to lower risk perception. 
Television was the most widely used medium to inform oneself about the accident. As many 
as 93.4% of the valid respondents identified television as an important medium for informing 
themselves, and for approximately one in four, television was the only medium they named as an 
important information source. As Sugimoto et al.(9) concluded, television is a ubiquitous medium 
and a great way to provide information to the public. However, in contrast to what Sugimoto et 
al. found in Japan, television use was significantly related to higher risk perception. 
Frewer, Rowe and Sjöberg(18) assumed that any impact that television has on risk perception 
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would most likely be through the availability heuristic. However, television was the only media 
channel not significantly correlated with duration of attention paid to the coverage. Even if there 
was significantly more coverage on television news, the public did not seem to have paid 
attention to it for a longer time, compared to those for whom television was not a major source of 
information. As such, the availability heuristic cannot explain this result. Coleman(10) assumed 
that it might be the visuals and structure of television news that cause heightened risk perception: 
the more vivid presentation and the less in-depth content (compared with written reports) could 
convey greater danger to the public. 
An alternative explanation could be the possible unique characteristics of the group of 
respondents who did not identify television as a major source of information. For example, 
Henning and Vorderer(19) found that students with a high need for cognition watch less television. 
People with a high need for cognition will also be more motivated to think, and thus, to base their 
opinion on factual information. This will possibly make them less dependent on heuristics, 
similar to what Yim and Vaganov(7) argued the effect of education could be. 
Interpersonal communication was significantly correlated with both satisfaction with the 
media coverage and the duration of attention paid to it, and it was a significant predictor of risk 
perception. The influence of interpersonal communication on risk perception is in line with 
previous research. (e.g., 10) 
The significant negative relationship between the miscellaneous online sources and risk 
perception is hard to explain, especially due to the vagueness of the category. Given YouTube’s 
prominence online, it is quite likely that it was the most important component in this category. 
While even entertainment can increase risk perception(27), this does not seem to be the case with 
YouTube, perhaps because YouTube clips differ greatly from traditional videos.(25) Unfortunately, 
the present study can only indicate the possible importance of YouTube. 
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The lack of effect of newspapers on risk perception is perhaps attributable to the balanced 
reporting on the subject. Media content analyses of the Belgian press revealed that a majority of 
newspaper articles were neutral towards nuclear energy. This was the case both for the first two 
months after the accident(17) and a year after the accident.(32) 
Radio failed to reach significance as a predictor of risk perception, even though it was an 
important predictor for fear of social disruption in Japan. Sugimoto et al.(9) attributed their results 
to the position that radio holds as a central element in an individual’s disaster plan in Japan. In 
Belgium, however, more people assume they would use television in case of a nuclear 
emergency, compared to radio.(15) Apparently, radio does not hold the same function as the central 
risk communicating channel, which could explain the lack of effect. Alternatively, the difference 
could also be related to the observation that the respondents were not directly affected by the 
nuclear accident, whereas the respondents of Sugimoto et al. all lived fairly close to the nuclear 
power plant in Fukushima. A third possible explanation could be the lack of visuals when 
compared to television. Even though radio news is similar to television news with respect to its 
linearity and structure (brief segments that are too short to give a broad context of the disaster), 
visuals are one major aspect in which it differs. 
Finally, the Internet was not a significant predictor of risk perception, possibly because of its 
heterogeneous nature. While Internet use was significantly positively correlated with the duration 
of attention paid to the news about the Fukushima nuclear disaster, there are large differences 
between the various online sources. 
Even though a great deal of research has been conducted on Twitter use during and after the 
2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, the studied population did not use Twitter as an important 
information source at that time, and Facebook was not widely used either. Sugimoto et al.(9) 
found similar results in Japan. They assumed that their results were due to the composition of 
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their sample (64% of which was over the age of fifty), but this does not seem to be the case in the 
present study. Perhaps the rather low usage was due to the audience not perceiving social media 
as being as credible as newspapers(14), for instance. 
In conclusion, some media channels are indeed significant predictors of long-term health-
related risk perception: television, interpersonal communication and miscellaneous Internet 
sources do have an influence on how the risk was perceived. Combined with the significant 
predictive power of satisfaction with the media coverage, it is evident that the media indeed play 
a role in shaping risk perception. 
5.1. Other Predictors of Perceived Risk 
Contrary to what the first hypothesis predicted, duration of attention paid to the primary media 
channels actually had a (small but statistically significant) negative correlation with risk 
perception. While it failed to reach significance in the regression analysis regarding online media 
channels, the results of both analyses point in the same direction: people who paid attention to the 
news for a longer period of time had a lower risk perception of the accident. Wåhlberg and 
Sjöberg(29) suggested a possible explanation: if the amount of media coverage decreases, so does 
risk perception because the risk loses its “accessibility” in the minds of the audience’s members. 
Cantone et al.(17) noted that there was a significant decrease in the number of articles published 
regarding Fukushima, even in the first nine weeks after the accident. Just two Belgian 
newspapers published over 180 articles in the month following the accident(17), while at the time 
of the data gathering, all Belgian newspapers together published 196 articles related to 
Fukushima. While this is still a fair amount, it does indicate a decrease in coverage. 
People who did not find the information satisfactory were more likely to have a higher risk 
perception of the accident, in accordance with the second hypothesis and previous research. 
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Additionally, they were also more likely to engage in interpersonal communication about the 
matter, which was also significantly related to heightened risk perception. This could indicate that 
people turned to each other and listened to the rumours that appeared in order to reduce the 
uncertainty that the (unsatisfactory) official information created.(34) Two other media channels 
came close to being significantly related to satisfaction with the information: blogs and the 
websites of (non-)governmental agencies. 
The third hypothesis received limited support, with only attitude towards nuclear energy 
being a significant predictor in both analyses. Gender and education each reached significance in 
only one analysis. 
Attitude towards nuclear power was the most powerful predictor of risk perception of the 
Fukushima nuclear accident. Proponents of nuclear energy perceived the risk of the accident to be 
lower, while opponents deemed it to be higher. This result lends support to the hypotheses of 
Sjöberg(37), Katsuya(35) and Siegrist and Visschers(36): proponents and opponents are likely to 
interpret a nuclear accident differently, in such a way as to fit with their previous held beliefs and 
attitudes. 
Education was the second most influential predictor for risk perception in the first 
regression analysis and it approached significance in the regression analysis for online channels. 
Education did seem to have an influence on risk perception: people with a higher level of 
education had a lower risk perception of the Fukushima nuclear accident, compared to those with 
a lower level of education. This result supports the findings of Whitfield et al.(2) The concrete 
dynamic behind this finding is unknown, however, as the literature offered many different 
explanations.(cf. 7, 28, 41, 44) 
Gender was not a significant predictor of risk perception for the primary media channels, 
while the literature suggested it could be. Possibly, the gender difference in risk perception of an 
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actual nuclear accident only appears in areas close to the site of the accident. Tateno and 
Yokoyama(13) found that a significant difference in anxiety between mothers and fathers only 
appeared in the Fukushima prefecture, but not in the rest of Japan. Drottz-Sjöberg and Sjöberg(39) 
also found a significant gender effect in Sweden after the Chernobyl nuclear accident, bearing in 
mind that Sweden was one of the countries particularly affected by the accident.(4) Even when 
respondents are asked questions regarding their fear of nuclear power technology or of a 
hypothetical nuclear accident, Brody(38) noted that the gender difference is more outspoken for the 
local items, compared to the general items. Perhaps Belgium is located too far away from 
Fukushima to have outspoken gender differences in the general population. 
In the analysis regarding online sources, however, gender did become a significant predictor 
of risk perception, with women perceiving the risk to be significantly higher than men. A possible 
explanation for this difference can be extracted from the study by Drottz-Sjöberg and Sjöberg.(39) 
They found that young men were the least risk aversive group. In the present study, the group that 
used the Internet was indeed significantly younger (year of birth: M = 1972.75, SD = 14.93) than 
the group that did not (M = 1961.61, SD = 17.30), t(603.474) = −9.956, p < 0.001. Perhaps the 
difference is a result of the significantly lower risk perception of the younger males that use the 
Internet. 
5.2. Practical Implications 
The results can provide some practical guidelines for risk communicators. First and foremost, the 
results clearly show that media channels are not simple equivalents and communicators should be 
careful in considering which media channel to use. Social media were not widely used to gain 
information about the nuclear accident in Fukushima. The public still preferred traditional media 
as their go-to source for information. Given the finding that traditional media coverage is often 
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echoed in social media(12), the traditional media should still be the focus of risk communicators. 
Television requires the most attention, as it was both widely used and significantly related to 
higher risk perception. 
Those who are not satisfied with the information most likely turn to interpersonal 
communication, blogs and/or the websites of (non-)governmental agencies. These last two 
sources could help risk communicators in providing information to those who were dissatisfied 
with the mainstream coverage. Blogs could “translate” the coverage into more understandable 
messages, enabling more people to make sense of the situation. The websites of (non-) 
governmental agencies could provide the public with large amounts of information, which people 
could use to draw their own conclusion. In this way, more people will be able to find information 
tailored to their needs and they will probably be more satisfied with the coverage, with lowered 
risk perception as a result. 
5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
Although the data set used in this study was representative of the adult Belgian population, 
it still had some limitations. Firstly, since not all factors could be controlled for, the results of the 
regression analyses cannot be interpreted as conclusive indications of causality. As the media use 
of 2011 predicted the risk perception in 2013, this correlational data can nevertheless provide 
some time ordering. A longitudinal study would have provided more definitive clues on causality, 
but because of the unpredictability of nuclear accidents, it is very difficult to gather a 
representative data set of this size before and after the accident. Secondly, in this study, it was not 
possible to control for how much exposure a respondent had to the channels in absolute terms. 
Next, it is possible that it was the (amount of) content on a channel and not the channel as such 
that altered risk perception. Therefore, future research could look into the quantitative and 
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qualitative differences in content between different media channels. Furthermore, the fact that the 
data were gathered over two years after the accident could also be considered slightly 
problematic. For example, Tateno and Yokoyama(13) thought that changes in perceptions would 
have disappeared if they conducted their study more than a year after the accident. However, this 
study still yielded several significant results, indicating that the effects on risk perceptions are 
quite resistant to change. 
Finally, since YouTube is the third most accessed Website worldwide, it seems warranted to 
include YouTube as a separate option in questions regarding media usage and choice in future 
studies. The use of “miscellaneous online sources” significantly decreased the risk perception of 
the Fukushima nuclear accident. While YouTube is probably the major component of this 
category, its influence can never be truly known if it is not studied as a separated category. 
 29 
6. CONCLUSION 
The results of this study demonstrated that some media channels did have a significant influence 
on long-term risk perception. This is remarkable since the analysis controlled for five variables, 
most of which were also (highly) significant predictors. 
The attitude towards nuclear energy was the strongest predictor of perceived risk, with 
people favourable towards nuclear power perceiving less risk. People with higher education also 
had lower risk perception, as did people who were very satisfied with the media coverage. The 
media channel will not cause people with low risk perception to suddenly experience high risk. In 
this sense, media channels are indeed not major factors in determining risk perception. 
However, the other significant predictors are all rather stable variables: attitudes towards 
nuclear power are difficult to change, and evidence suggests that even after a nuclear accident, 
attitudes quickly bounce back to pre-accident levels.(36) Raising the educational level of a 
population is certainly possible, but it requires time and effort. The same is true for satisfaction 
with the media coverage: although it is perfectly possible for journalists and risk communicators 
to improve their messages to better suit the needs of their audience, this will not happen 
overnight. 
In comparison, which media channel one uses is something that is more volatile. Of course, 
there are practical limitations that prevent everyone from having access to all media channels. 
However, as the results demonstrated, most people already use more than one medium to get 
informed. Depending on which medium gets the most weight in a person’s media mix, their risk 
perception might change. Although this change would be subtle at best, it is still remarkable that 
such a minor difference can indeed significantly influence risk perception. 
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APPENDICES 
Table V: Bivariate Correlations between Primary Media Channels and Satisfaction/Duration 
 
 Duration Satisfaction Television Radio Newspapers Internet Interpersonal 
communication 
Duration  1       
Satisfaction -0.071*   1      
Television -0.006  0.021  1     
Radio  0.140** -0.033  0.043  1    
Newspapers  0.196**  0.042  0.136**  0.312**  1   
Internet  0.187** -0.026 -0.082*  0.185**  0.219**  1  
Interpersonal communication  0.113** -0.113**  0.034  0.189**  0.135**  0.209**  1 
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
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Table VI: Bivariate Correlations between Online Media Channels and Satisfaction/Duration 
 
 Duration Satisfaction Newspaper 
sites 
TV/Radio 
sites 
Agencies’ 
sites 
Twitter Facebook Blogs Other 
Duration  1         
Satisfaction -0.071*  1        
Newspaper sites  0.085 -0.029  1       
TV/Radio sites  0.039 -0.036  0.036  1      
Agencies’ sites  0.175** -0.114  0.094  0.290**  1     
Twitter -0.066  0.027  0.035 -0.001  0.090  1    
Facebook -0.158** -0.034 -0.029  0.025  0.031  0.252**  1   
Blogs  0.194** -0.117 -0.162** -0.127*  0.021  0.121*  0.086  1  
Other -0.015 -0.011 -0.252** -0.024 -0.054 -0.057  0.036  0.143*  1 
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
